But the main question is if Browning “giant” size HQ was an asset or a liability. I agree with Peter Haclerode and mr. Wright on that issue. Dropping\landing Browning in the first wave was excessive. An airborne corps HQ was needed, but the key of the operation was airlift capacity in the first days. Browning could have been flown later. First things first, I have been trained.

Even if the additional lift wasn’t scheduled for Arnhem (a lot of lift capacity fro browning was taken from Gavin division) it could have allowed Gavin to have more artillery and more rifle strenght and push to the bridge (and defend the heights).

Maybe is not an HQ too far (as has been pointed out a corps HQ was needed for the phase 2 exploitation), but certianly an HQ too early.

I would also count Eric Bols, Gale’s successor. The reason I asked which commanders you meant was that, at Brigade and Battalion level, there were excellent men in charge.

To answer your statement – yes but only for one day or less! As soon as the two British Corps commanders crossed the Rhine about ten miles away they were supposed to revert to British command. Note that in the last month of the war Montgomery was so impressed with Ridgeway that he would trust him with anything!

Yet, Ridgway was in overall command of airborne forces on Op Varsity.

Rank was also all important – I believe Ridgeway was just a major-general at the time, one below Browning and two below Brereton.

Actually I suspect that this whole debate on the corps commander is moot – in view of the general failure of communications whoever it was could probably do nothing in the critical early days and would have been over-ridden by the air marshals and generals in the planning stage.

The influential person who would have known about Ridgway’s superior leadership qualities was Brereton, who, after some politicking by Browning, had slated Ridgway for command of Linnet II, the successor to Market. It was only when Browning threatened to resign that further discussions took place and he was retained in command, but of a British/Polish operation (Comet). Browning had no field experience, prior to Holland. He left the 1st Airborne Division before it went to North Africa. Although he was parachute and glider trained, it still remains the fact that his experience was administrative. Ridgway was time-served in Sicily, Normandy and the Ardennes. However, when Market was put on the table, Brereton appointed Browning as ground commander, since he saw it as an extension of Linnet II. I have not read anywhere of the ‘rule’ to alternate nationalities. It was, in my opinion, a huge mistake to appoint Browning.

I will concur on the plan to land away from the bridges. This is one of the ‘failures’ which has been discussed at length.

Browning for Brereton and Ridgway as FAAA Deputy. Again, my opinion is that if it had happened, the roles should have been reversed.

Also it is a little presumptuous to assume that people would have known that Ridgeway was a better corps commander than Browning. The latter had faults, but he had been the administrative commander of the two division British airborne corps for over a year. Both had led airborne divisions in action. The ‘pissing in the woods’ episode is questionable – it was written at the time not after, but there is the suggestion that some PR flak was writing it to make hime seem comparable to Patton, who seems to have flooded half of Italy and France! However the whole issue of his replacement is utterly moot in any case as the ‘rule’ in combined operations was that nationalities alternated by level of command. So you had the American Brereton as army, then the British Browning as corps commanders.

Which does touch on one very major issue; many (I have to admit myself) feel that the critical failure was to bow to the airforce demands for ’safe’ airdrop zones over the army demand for ‘close’ ones. This was particularly acute at Nijmegan where the drops were even further away than they were at Arnhem. It also seems (though the evidence is inconclusive) that it was the airforces that voted against ‘coup-de-main’ glider landings onto the bridges as was done In Normandy. I have always wondered what would have happened if Browning had replaced Brereton (who I understand had a very mixed war record) with Ridgeway taking his place.

But that would never have happened because neither the Army Air Corps or the Royal Air Force would have allowed its squadrons to be commanded by an British or American Army general!

So rather cynically I suspect that Gerald’s comment about political arena(in the sense of politicians) is much more applicable to the politics of generals and their enormous egos’s. So the lesson I would see from the battle is that the good of soldiers and nations must never be subordinated to the wishes of the military services.