Comments on: Author POV – Gen. Frederick Browning’s Entourage Too Far

By: mike neiger

mike neiger — Sat, 19 Feb 2011 18:34:37 +0000

dont really care who should have been charge. the point is these people knew models panzers were there at arnhem. also the drop zones were 8 miles away. the radios didnt work. and if anyone complained they were sent packing. these so called great men of battle. sent men to their deaths and didnt care. montgomery was the worst general in the history of warfare. the big generlas only wanted glory at the expense of others deaths. they were dipictable humans

By: Arrigo Velicogna

Arrigo Velicogna — Wed, 28 Jan 2009 16:54:52 +0000

I agree with the overall comments about overconfidence or, a better, term, overeliance on old information. The allies were experiencing the Ultra Blckout with germans relying on land communications instead than on wireless. Their big picture had dried up after normandy. They knew Bittrich was in arnhem, but not hinv retiurn strenght for the forces involved the assumed they were a non-entity.

But the main question is if Browning “giant” size HQ was an asset or a liability. I agree with Peter Haclerode and mr. Wright on that issue. Dropping\landing Browning in the first wave was excessive. An airborne corps HQ was needed, but the key of the operation was airlift capacity in the first days. Browning could have been flown later. First things first, I have been trained.

Even if the additional lift wasn’t scheduled for Arnhem (a lot of lift capacity fro browning was taken from Gavin division) it could have allowed Gavin to have more artillery and more rifle strenght and push to the bridge (and defend the heights).

Maybe is not an HQ too far (as has been pointed out a corps HQ was needed for the phase 2 exploitation), but certianly an HQ too early.

By: Steve Wright

Steve Wright — Mon, 26 Jan 2009 16:00:43 +0000

David,

I would also count Eric Bols, Gale’s successor. The reason I asked which commanders you meant was that, at Brigade and Battalion level, there were excellent men in charge.

By: Dennis Largess

Dennis Largess — Wed, 21 Jan 2009 14:59:53 +0000

One of the basic pillars on which Market-Garden rested was that the German army was already half defeated.
A general under appreciation of the defensive abilities of the German army shows through in the struggle for Normandy. From the beginning, Montgomery always underestimated the enemy’s defensive capabilities. If you really look at his plans to penetrate the enemy’s positions, they only appreciate the german forward positions. The british soldiers were constantly finding that their pre-assault planning assumed the enemies main line of defense would be breached, when they were only through the outpost defenses. Decision in Normandy, by Carlo d’Este, discusses this in great detail.
I believe the planning failure of Operation Market, may be ascribed to a similar bias. Once you have seized the bridges, then the battle is won.

By: David Hughes

David Hughes — Tue, 20 Jan 2009 01:51:48 +0000

Division and Corps – Gale of the 6th Airborne Division commander and Pritchard (of the independent parachute brigade in Italy) seem to have been competant. Of course criticism was always muted (to say the least) during the war. The only giveaway is the failure to promote or heavily decorate after a battle – Browning for example.

By: Steve Wright

Steve Wright — Sun, 18 Jan 2009 18:53:48 +0000

Which para commanders do you mean: Battalion or Brigade; and to which Division are you referring?

By: David Hughes

David Hughes — Sun, 18 Jan 2009 00:46:46 +0000

Yes – by then they had learnt their lesson about Browning – he was in disgrace. So too was the equally culpable commander of the 1st Airborne Division. It really is amazing how useless all but one of the UK para commanders were – compared with the US – lacking any firm knowledge I believe they in contrast were all better than competant?

To answer your statement – yes but only for one day or less! As soon as the two British Corps commanders crossed the Rhine about ten miles away they were supposed to revert to British command. Note that in the last month of the war Montgomery was so impressed with Ridgeway that he would trust him with anything!

By: Steve Wright

Steve Wright — Sat, 17 Jan 2009 10:59:54 +0000

“I cannot believe that the British would ever have permitted one of its elite forces to be commanded (not just controlled) by only American superiors.”

Yet, Ridgway was in overall command of airborne forces on Op Varsity.

By: David Hughes

David Hughes — Sat, 17 Jan 2009 01:03:04 +0000

Steve: Alas no matter what, in retrospect one thinks of Ridgeway, it would still be utterly impossible for an Allied force to operate with all of its senior echelons held by Americans. Whatever maybe the case today, in WWII things simply did not happen that way. If you want to see a clear example of this just check out the changes in the command structure in the Mediterranean at Theatre Army Group and Army level. I cannot believe that the British would ever have permitted one of its elite forces to be commanded (not just controlled) by only American superiors. Especially in view of what happened when they allowed assault troops to be put under American command at Salerno and Anzio. Now I am fully aware that Ridgeway was a towering genius compared with ineffectuals like Clarke and Lucus but that again was not known at the time.

Rank was also all important – I believe Ridgeway was just a major-general at the time, one below Browning and two below Brereton.

Actually I suspect that this whole debate on the corps commander is moot – in view of the general failure of communications whoever it was could probably do nothing in the critical early days and would have been over-ridden by the air marshals and generals in the planning stage.

By: Steve Wright

Steve Wright — Thu, 15 Jan 2009 18:42:41 +0000

I have to agree with Mr Illies about the over-confidence of the Allies. Montgomery, in particular, thought he had this one ‘in the bag’. Strangely, it was Browning who thought Monty was going a ‘bridge too far’, yet he (Browning) was quite happy to dismiss out of hand the intelligence that he received about the German presence in and around Arnhem.

The influential person who would have known about Ridgway’s superior leadership qualities was Brereton, who, after some politicking by Browning, had slated Ridgway for command of Linnet II, the successor to Market. It was only when Browning threatened to resign that further discussions took place and he was retained in command, but of a British/Polish operation (Comet). Browning had no field experience, prior to Holland. He left the 1st Airborne Division before it went to North Africa. Although he was parachute and glider trained, it still remains the fact that his experience was administrative. Ridgway was time-served in Sicily, Normandy and the Ardennes. However, when Market was put on the table, Brereton appointed Browning as ground commander, since he saw it as an extension of Linnet II. I have not read anywhere of the ‘rule’ to alternate nationalities. It was, in my opinion, a huge mistake to appoint Browning.

I will concur on the plan to land away from the bridges. This is one of the ‘failures’ which has been discussed at length.

Browning for Brereton and Ridgway as FAAA Deputy. Again, my opinion is that if it had happened, the roles should have been reversed.