Mr Kopchuk’s last point can’t be stressed enough. Allied bombing kept vast number of 88’s, tactically the strongest German chesspiece, off the fighting fronts, along with vast numbers of support troops, signal and optical equipment required at ths fronts

By paul penrod on Sep 29, 2009 at 1:18 pm

Overall the article does a bad job at properly addressing the main issue of effectivenes and morality as regards the policy of trying to win the war by mass murder of civilians from the air. The final quote of Arthur Harris that allegedly there is no such thing as morality in war is a thinly veiled declaration of bancruptcy as far as anything like values is concerned. If there is no such thing as morality in war, why then bother about outrages such as the Rape of Nanking, SS massacres like in Malmedy and the like?

The real issue is if it could be justified to devote 40% of Britains wartimwe budget into the indiscriminate killing of mainly women and children in Germany, annihilating the cultural substance of the continent’s center forever and conducting the greatest book burning of history along the way.

Britain’s political and military leaders DID have other options. The fast mosquito bombers, fast enough to evade interdiction and capable of precise pinpoint attacks on strategic targets such as communication and transportation lines and key industrial facilities, were availlable early in the war. It was a conscious decision made by RAF Bomber Command not to increase their production but to stick to the buildup of Lancaster, Wellington and Halifax bombers fleets to exterminate cities as a whole.

Nazi Germany had access to a virtually unlimited pool of forced workers labour. Therefore, the idea of crippling the war economy to a standstill by killing off the workforce was flawed from the start.

As the article rightly points out, the disruption of railway lines brought elements of the German war industry to a standstill. Sadly, this was only brought about shortly before factories were overrun by Allied ground forces anyway.

Overall, the historical record shows clearly how effective pinpoint attacks on fuel refineries, gas lines, waterways and especially railway lines were to bring the Nazi war machine to a standstill. The Allies had a choice between bringing the Nazi war machine to a standstill by intelligent tactical raids or conducting a war of extermination against Germany’s civilian population and its cultural heritage and identity.

For the most part, the right choices were made too seldom and too late. Time and again military barracks and installations just outside of cities were left entirely unscathed while Allied bomber fleets would rather carpet bomb historical city centres and the residential districts around them: a first wave of bombers would crack open the medieval city centres. Several following waves would then start and sustain a firestorm in the wreckage with incendiary bombs. Consecutive waves with explosive bombs would then secure maximum casualties among firefighters, ambulances and the masses of fleeeing civilians, trying to evade the firestorm.

Had the Allies concentrated their resources on really disrupting the bottlenecks and ifelines of the Nazi war industry infrastructure with minimum civilian casualties instead of engaging in a mindless rampage of mass murder and culturecide, the war might very well have ended in 1943. The overall death toll in WWII might then have been less than half of what we ended up with!

It is important to honestly face this unpleasant truth because those who fail to learn from the errors of the past are condemned to repeat them.

By Sven Oliver Roth on Oct 2, 2009 at 6:36 am

cool blog

By Roberto on Oct 4, 2009 at 5:35 am

Mr. Sven Roth,

As with you and many more who are revisionists of history the issue was not one of mass murder of civilians. There has been many reasons for this view of Bomber Command’s enormous contribution to the winning of WWII. Perhaps it was the fact that when Winston Churchill was asked point blank in the British parlament if they were bombing civilians he would deneign it or avoid answering the question. In so doing, Sir Arthur Harris was made the scape goat of the bombing campaign of WWII.

Sir Arthur Harris carried out the directives issues to him. In Feb 1942 AVM Bottomley sent the following directive to AM Baldwin: “the primary object of your operations should now be focused on the morale of the enemy civil population and in particular, of the industrial workers.”

In Jan 1943 the Casablance Confeence Directive decided by Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin stated: “your primary object will be the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. With that general concept, your primary objectives, subject to the exigencies of weather and of tactical feasibility, will for the present be in the following order of priority: (a) German submarine construction yards. (b) The German aircraft industry. (c) Transportation. (d) Oil plants. (e) Other targets in enemy war industry. The above order of priority may be varied from time to time according to developments in the strategical situation. Moreover, other objectives of great importance either from political or military point of view must be attacked….”

Then in Jun 1943 came the Pointblank Directive from AVM Bottomley to Harris ” To this end the Combined Chiefs of Staff have decided that first priority in the operation of British and American bombers based in the United Kingdom shall be accorded to the attack of German fighter forces and the industry upon which they depend. … The primary object of the bomber forces remains as set out in the original directive issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (dated 21 Jan 43, The Casablanca Directive) i.e.: ‘the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.’

Let there be no mistake or misunderstanding it was politians who decided the tasks and roles of Bomber Command, not Sir A. Harris or those who served in Bomber Command.

Let us remember that from 1940 until the invasion of Italy there was no way for the Allies in the West to hit back at the Axis. The main and only way was through Bomber Command and the US Army Air Corp. I have spoken to several civilians who lived in England during the war and they said they used to cheer from the roof tops as the bombers were flying overhead to hit targets in Germany. We can’t use moral standards of today to judge what was happening at the time.

The US’s pinpoint bombing campaign was far from a pinpoint bombing campaign. Their formations were from 780 yards wide to 1000 yards deep. When the lead bomber dropped his bombs everyone else dropped their bombs. The US caused much collateral damage. It was shown at the time that Bomber Commands ability to hit a target at night was better than the US’s ability to hit targets during the day. They could only better BC ability to hit a target when it was a clear day with no clouds.

So everyone was hitting civilians.

Many of the veterans, of BC, I have spoken to said the German people voted in Hitler, supported his policies and worked in the factories that they were bombing. Everyone was fair game as a target, even those in Dresden.

As for using more Mosquito’s, Bomber Harris himself responded to this one: the Mossies carried less bombs so they couldn’t inflict as much damage. They couldn’t have built enough airfields nor trained enough pilots to do the job that the heavy bombers (Lancasters and Halifaxes) were doing. The infrastructure couldn’t have supported it.

The idea of the bombing was not to kill the workers it was to destroy their morale. This they did achieve. Many German civilians interviewed after the war spoke about how they had given up because of the allied bombing campaign.

Yes, the record did show how effective the bombing of the oil refineries was effective. One of the items Bomber Command lacked during the war was effective intelligence to determine how effective or not they were on any target. Many times Harris sent his bombers after precision targets based on what the air minitry said. He based these decisions on, if this or that target is destroyed it will bring this or that production to a standstill. BC hit those targets and destroyed them and the production didn’t come to a standstill. So as Harris put it, he stuck to his main directive to undermine the morale of the enemy. Which again, he was successful at doing.

A war can’t be won by air power alone. This has been proven in wars since. Air power can be a major factor in the winning of the war, however the infantry still has to go in and take the ground.

Bomber Command was extremely effective in every role and task it was given and was a major contributing factor to winning the war. So let us accept this fact. You may not have liked the way they did it, however they did do it and they helped to win the war. So stop trying to judge what they did based on your morality applied during 1939-45. It won’t work.

By Greg Kopchuk on Oct 23, 2009 at 11:11 pm

Dear Mr Roth,

I would recommend that we keep the excitement out and stick to the facts.
Let us therefore stay clear from phrases like “mass murder of civilians”. If Hitlerhad 1.000 heavy bombers in 1939 he would have used them. We all know it.
“Killing of (Germany’s) workforce” never was an official policy of Bomber Command. To suggest otherwise is to spread untruth, to put it mildly.
“Mosquito was available early in the war”. Operationally (if you know the meaning of the word) it was available on a larger scale in mid 1942. Was “early in the war” ?
Mosquito was “capable of precise pinpoint attacks”. Indeed, but only when using the Oboe system which was operational no further than the Ruhr Valley. Check it out for yourself.
“Historical record clearly shows how effective pinpoint attacks were”
Oh dear… Any precise examples ? Were the famous Dambusters effective ? To the best of my knowledge – no.
Precise air attacks are a myth. If the famous American bombsight Norden was such effective why did the Americans reverted to the carpet bombardment in Japan ? Why did they buy license to produce British H2S radar ? Beacuse over the European continent they couldn’t get any any near the target. Europe is not the sunny Texas where the Americans practised their “pinpoint’ accuracy.
I’m sure you do realize the importance of a long night during the night bombing. For half a year (May till October) the British couldn’t bomb most of the German targets because they were located too far from their bases.
It’s good you know of a place like Malmedy. For you information: of such places we have in Poland about 100, maybe more. By the way – to put it mildly you do an injustice to the men of Bomber Command by comparing them to the SS-men from Malmedy, or any other place.
The Allied flyers were shot at and very often killed. How many of the SS-men form “Malmedy” were killed while actually butchering the civilians ?
I most certainly agree with you: “it’s important to honestly face the unpleasant truth.
Regards
wam

By wam on Nov 4, 2009 at 5:40 am

And don’t forget effect on morale for people in occupied europe. This was the only sign of hope. Looking at the contrail during the day and hearing BC at night was for many the only sign that one day germany could be defeated.

By G Zuili on Nov 7, 2009 at 3:18 pm

Dear Mr. Kropchuk,

thank you for your elaborate answer. My apologies for the very late reply.There are nicer things to spend your spare time on than discussing the carpet-bombing of population centres.

As for responsibility, there can indeed be little debate that Arthur Harris of RAF Bomber Command didn’t operate in a vacuum and indeed got the directives which sanctioned his trademark strategy of carpet bombing civilian population centers. If we are prepared to criticise this form of warfare, this doesn’t let anyone off the hook who was in the command chain. Harris kept reiterating that solely flattening Germans cities would win the war alone.

Concerning your point that for much of the war it was only the Bombers through which the western Allies could hit back at Hitler’s forces, I think we shouldn’t overlook the ongoing war in North Africa from ‘41 to ‘43. One o the ironies of the war is that Britain lacked a large Bomber force when it was really threatened with an Invasion.It was only when Britain’s existence was no longer on the line that RAF Bomber Command started the 1000 bomber raids.

As for the morale effect on the British side, i.e. British civilians cheering from the rooftops at RAF bombers, that was certainly true. Interestingly, it was usually those who had never experienced severe bombing who cheered most about bombing German civilians. In Places like Coventry, Hull or London’s East End, as British opinion surveys of the time clearly demonstrated, a majority of the people polled where AGAINST RAF bombing raids on German civilians. That should indeed be food for thought. What’s more, I would find it hard to justify the killing of half a million civilians, including 80,000 children with such a moderate morale boost on the Allied side.

But of course there are other factors of justification on top of that.

You have rightly pointed out that the preciseness of USAAF pinpoint attack left much to be desired and often caused numerous civilian casualties. You concluded this observation with the words “thus, everybody was killing civilans”.

One aspect this reasoning complete fails to acknowledge, though, is the scope of killing civilians, resulting directly from the very purpose of the bombing runs. It is two entirely different things to cause collateral damage when attacking specific war-relevant installations on the one hand or, on the other hand, to intentionally maximise civilian casualties by simply attacking a city as such by designating the city center as the taget marker zone. Any serious discussion of the bomber war must address this most basic distinction instead of trying to obfusciate it.

You also mentioned that several BC veterans had told you that Germans had voted in Hitler, supported his policies and worked in his factories which would render any inhabitant of Germany a legitimate target.

While I can readily understand from a human point of view that this is they way BC veterans would combat any hints of guilt about their dangerous and costly missions, I don’t think that ordinary BC servicepeople who were in their 20s and 30s then, would be the first choice of experts when it comes to assessing if the people who they were bombing from an altitude of 10,000 feet really deserved this kind of massacring.

Let’s take Hamburg, for instance, the target of operation Gomorrha. Dou you know how many people voted for Hitler there in the last free elections? 27%. I don’t know if a support rate of 27% in 1932 would justify in your book the destruction of the whole city and the massacring of its population in 1943. Whats more, it would be preposterously fallacious to assume that even those meagre 27% voted for something like a world war or even the Holocaust in 1932.

I once talked to a man who lived in Hamburg and had indeed voted for Hitler in 1932. Our conversation was very frank and honest.After all, he was in his 90s,at the end of his life, and he happened to be my grand-uncle. At the beginning of our conversation I had asked him if he hadn’t felt a genuine sense of loathing for the Nazi thugs in the streets. He said that he had entertained that sense of loathing rather for the communists. He was a small business man and had feared a communist takeover. “And that’s why I voted for Hitler” he added to my surprise. Had he foreseen what Hitler would later do? Hardly. Three years later he was classified as a “quarter-Jew” by the Nuremberg race laws. So much for being “fair game” because of a vote a decade earlier…

What I found most puzzling in your argumentation was that you actually combined the official policy of denial of the British and US government during the war (”killing civilians wasn’t the objective”) with the internal and post-war justification that “everyone was fair game, even those in Dresden”.

I think that both statements are already wrong on their own merits and furthermore cannot be logically claimed at the same time:

- If someone directs an airplane into a building filled with civilians it would be ludicrous to say he wasn’t engaged in intentionally killing those civilians. If he dropped instead a cluster of 500 lb bombs on that building he still couldn’t claim he wasn’t engaged in killing those civilians. And if someone sends 1,000 planes to drop 10,000 bombs on an entire city he still couldn’t claim that he wasn’t engaged in killing a huge number of civilians. When Harris gave the executive order “to destroy Hamburg” (that was the entire definition of the operational goal of operation Gomorrha) or later on to “flatten Berlin from one end to the other” he ordered the dstruction of civilian population centres with everything they contained, including, of course the civilians living there.

- The notion that “everyone was fair game” in the area bombing campaign is disturbingly revealing in its frankness. Obviously, it denies any distinction between combatants and noncombatants. It advocates extermination of populations as a legitimate method of warfare. I don’t want to engage in any value-driven assessment of this statement.It speaks for itself.

By Sven Oliver Roth on Jan 13, 2010 at 7:06 pm

I certainly do not agree with Bomber Harris: “Don’t talk to me about morality in war, there is no such thing.” The ethical aspect is most imporant, however, I will not bring that up today.

Concerning the effect of the German Aircraft Industry

I have been looking at the original document of the THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY summary report using this link:

http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm#taogap

I have searched some of the quotes in this Armchair General article none of the them. What is this article quoting?

I am skeptical both of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey and this article’s reading of it. I find this part particularly hard to believe: “Strategic bombing forced the dispersal of the aircraft industry. This disruption alone paid the cost of Allied bombing.” The dispersal being worth 40% of Britain’s war effort -not to mention the American war effort- sounds just plain silly.

Sensemaker

By Sensemaker on Mar 18, 2010 at 6:21 am