Things are not so simple at that level. Stalin had already switched sides once in the war and despite the appalling losses, could have arguably declared victory once he had expelled the Germans from Russia. While that was something of a hollow threat against prior to D-Day, once the the US and UK were on the board in Europe, Stalin had had genuine leverage. The mere risk of so many German divisions coming from the East had to have weighed on Russia.

In a similar vein, whose to say that Stalin’s Red Army would even stop after German? In that sense, a single narrow thrust into Germany from some particularly direction – either by Monty or Patton, might have knocked Germany out of the war, but would have also exposed the Allies to a flanking attack by the Russians. Only a united and broad offensive, with not 40 divisions up against the Soviet frontier, but, ALL of the Allied divisions, with ALL of western europe behind its back, would have prevented that. Do you think Ike could have a press conference of even allow anyone as important as a general to think that the USA and UK were concerned about the possibility of a war with the Soviet Union?

So yes, if the Soviet Union were a like minded western ally, then Monty or Patton should have been given the gasoline and sent on their way. But the Soviet Union wasn’t, and so Ike’s broad advance was in fact the best way to go.

Generally speaking I think it points up the deficiencies of the Normandy option – it was such a long way from the Normandy beaches to the heart of German power. Supply issues closed off the options.

After Normandy when they ( the Germans) were in full retreat, a major attack to northern Germany and on to the Rhur was expected. The Generals as explained to the Author were in no position to oppose the attack.
The book is revealing.Giving the German side of the war.

If I may put in another word, the question of logistics is often raised. The Allies in autumn 1944 had great strength in manpower, armour and all equipment, but prior to opening up a large Channel port, it was impossible to bring all their strength to bear on the front line.

Eisenhower stated this problem meant Montgomery’s planned thrust could not have been maintained logistically. Carlo d’Este echoes that view. However, Monty’s plan, if implemented as he intended, would actually have solved the logistic problem more swiftly than any other approach.

First, you take all the armour and motorised units of four armies (Crerar, Dempsey, Simpson, Hodges) and make one mobile attacking force, under a single commander (Montgomery or Bradley). Secondly, you take the logistic resources (engineers, pioneers, transport, fuel, etc.) of five armies (the above four plus Patton) and use them to support the attack. You send this mighty force driving ahead on the left wing through Belgium and Holland, leaving non-motorised troops behind in static defence.

The attacking force is now more mobile than ever, because it is 100% motorised, and has more fuel than ever, because it has five armies’ worth of fuel in place of four. At the same time, the combined engineering and pioneer resources of five armies give it the ability to surmount rapidly any and all physical obstacles it may meet. It is also easier to resupply these forces, as they are all in one place, not dispersed on a wide front. In this way, the immediate logistic problems are solved.

The nub of the matter is this: the amount of fuel and resources initially available under Ike’s plan and Monty’s plan is the same. As events showed, that amount was sufficient to let five entire armies move forward steadily in line abreast along the whole front. If you extract the armour and mass it in one sector, and give it all the fuel and support, you can then drive that smaller but much more powerful force ahead a lot faster and a lot further.

What can the enemy now do against this fast-striding behemoth? Any German armoured force in or near its path faces a sharp dilemma: either fight where you stand (suicide) or withdraw to concentrate with other units (surrendering territory). The only logical course for the German armoured and mobile units is to withdraw, pull together whatever strength they have and postpone battle until it becomes unavoidable.

However, it is quite possible that Hitler, initially at least, would have issued non-withdrawal orders. In that case, each Panzer force would have been destroyed in turn as it came up against the Mighty Mobile. Either way, the Allied advance would rapidly clear the Low Countries of German armour. Now Antwerp and other ports could be opened up.

In this scenario, German occupying troops left stranded by the disappearance of their armour and supplies would no doubt resist for a time and would sabotage and destroy port facilities as much as they could (as happened in the actual event). However, the difference in this case is, first, the time they have available for sabotage is less, because the clearance of the region has been that much quicker, and secondly, the resources the Allies have for repairing facilities are that much greater (five armies’ engineers instead of one or two).

As a result, Antwerp and other ports would have been in operational use by the Allies a good deal earlier than actually happened, and the Allied thrust would have been reinforced all the more.

Additionally the Germans knew the attack was coming, had fortified the area extensively and counterattacked with several panzer divisions and lost up to 100 tanks themselves in the process; the attack effectively destroyed several panzer divisions ability to resist while the British divisions were able to continue the offensive several days later with Operation Spring before being redeployed across the front for Bluecoat.

If anything, Goodwood highlights that the comment of drawing the German tanks into a decisive battle and defeating them was very well much a possibility by the Allied forces. It was achieved at the Second Battle of El Alamein and it was achieved near Caen during Goodwood.

The more I think about I also agree the allies did pursue the correct strategy: they kept fighting on their two axis of attack until they reached the limit of logistics. The way to end the war quicker was not to slow down the advance. Also, they were trying to win before having to face another winter.

Limit of logistics obviously means petroleum products. It would be interesting to see at what point the allies could have had enough oil to not run out and what course of action. Was it refined products, so if less had been used in Italy or the Pacific would they not have run out? Was it transport to the European shore, was it distribution on the continent, or was the advance so quick the infrastructure could not keep up? Probably in hindsight such a decision would have to have been in 1942, which would have been unrealistic“given the military situation at the time.