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A Lingering Controversy: Eisenhower’s ‘Broad Front’ StrategyBy Carlo D'Este | Carlo D'Este|War College | Published: October 07, 2009 at 4:26 pm
 Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, tours the front lines. (National Archives) The war of words over the choices by which the war might have been won was, in the end, all but irrelevant. Not only was it politically impossible to have permitted the British to win the war by means of the narrow front, there is ample evidence to question if such a drive, if mounted, could have been logistically sustained beyond the Ruhr. It has been sixty-five years since Dwight Eisenhower articulated his broad front strategy for ending the war in Europe and the consequences of that decision still linger on to this day. At the time the Allied generals quarreled over Ike’s decision, and from the time the war ended historians have taken sides to praise or condemn it. Some of the war’s most contentious debates have sprung from this decision. For his part, Eisenhower stubbornly never wavered in his belief that he had chosen the correct strategy. This is what it was all about. The Normandy campaign ended in late August 1944 in a rout and with the German army in complete disarray. As the Allied armies crossed the Seine and began sweeping into Belgium and Lorraine it seemed to many that the Germans were finished and the war would surely be over by Christmas. In mid-August, Eisenhower announced his intention to assume command of the Allied land forces on September 1. In the spring of 1944, while most were concentrating on the D-day invasion, a small group of SHAEF planners had for many weeks been busy analyzing Eisenhower’s mandate “to undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.” On May 3 they presented Eisenhower with alternative courses of action after Normandy to attain that goal. These included the capture of the Ruhr in order to cripple Germany’s war-making capability, and the capture of Berlin. The four options presented for an advance to the Ruhr were all variations of a broad Allied advance both north and south of the rugged Ardennes Forest. Eisenhower rejected Berlin as a military objective and began to study his two options for seizing the Ruhr by either a frontal assault or through an envelopment. On May 27 Eisenhower affirmed the broad front strategy recommended by his planners. This is the only known document that spelled out SHAEF’s post-Normandy strategy. For Eisenhower, the student of history, the solution was self-evident. Military commanders dream of the double envelopment, of surrounding an objective on two sides by pincer movements and crushing it behind their combined weight as had been intended at Falaise. When he studied the map of Europe in 1944, Eisenhower was drawn by his knowledge of history to one of his boyhood heroes, Hannibal, the Carthaginian general whose masterful defeat of the Romans at Cannae in 216 B.C. is considered one of the classic battles of history. With the Ardennes as an impediment that of necessity had to be bypassed, Eisenhower envisioned a Hannibal-like Cannae by means of a double envelopment of the Ruhr. A force under Montgomery 21st Army Group would advance north of the Ardennes to strike the Ruhr while a second force consisting of Bradley’s 12th Army Group advanced south of the Ardennes through Lorraine, and swung north to Cologne to complete the double envelopment. Moreover, the scheme bore more than a passing likeness to the plan of another general Eisenhower had studied at length: Ulysses S. Grant and his 1864 strategy for defeating the Confederacy.  General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, commanding general of the Allied Ground Forces in Normandy, is seen here with Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley, commanding general of the First U.S. Army, as they study a situation map in 1944. (National Archives) Montgomery was also convinced, not without justification, that Eisenhower and SHAEF were ill-prepared for the task of running the ground war. “The whole command set up was fundamentally wrong. There was no one who could give his complete and undivided attention to the day to day direction of the land battle as a whole,” he told Australian journalist and military historian Chester Wilmot after the war. Eisenhower “had not the experience, the knowledge, the organization, or the time. He should have been devoting himself to questions of overall strategy, to political problems, and to problems of inter-Allied relations and military government . . . Instead he insisted on trying the run the land battle himself. Here he was out of his depth and in trying to do this he neglected his real job on the highest level.” As the Normandy campaign had progressed, Montgomery found Eisenhower’s presence more distraction than help. Montgomery conducted meetings in a brisk and businesslike manner, but when Eisenhower was present he was critical of what he believed tended to be too much conversation and too little substance. Montgomery also realized that he stood little chance of winning over Eisenhower at any meeting involving members of the SHAEF staff and arranged to have Eisenhower visit his field headquarters on August 23. Either he or Bradley, he said, should control the ground war, and with the growing insufficiency of supplies, the war could not be won in 1944 unless priority were given his proposed offensive which, he argued, must also include the First U.S. Army on his right flank. Eisenhower agreed to give priority of resupply to Lt. Gen. Miles Dempsey’s Second British Army and, “no matter what the command arrangements,” he “would see to it that Montgomery retained “operational coordination” over the northern flank of the Allied advance.” On September 5 Eisenhower cabled Montgomery to reaffirm his intention to advance on a broad front, pointing out that with the destruction of the bulk of the German Army in the west, “We must immediately exploit our success by promptly breaching the Siegfried Line, crossing the Rhine on a wide front and seizing the Saar and the Ruhr. This I intend to do with all possible speed … [which] will give us a stranglehold on two of Germany’s main industrial areas and likely destroy her capacity to wage war.” He would give priority to the Ruhr to include the allocation of the precious logistical resources. In a private office memorandum written that same day, Eisenhower summarized his position. “For some days it has been obvious that our military forces can advance almost at will, subject only to the requirement for maintenance . . . The defeat of the German armies is complete, and the only thing now needed to realize the whole conception is speed. Our rapidity of movement will depend upon maintenance, in which we are now stretched to the limit . . . I now deem it important, while supporting the advance eastward through Belgium, to get Patton moving once again so that we may be fully prepared to carry out the original conception for the final stage of the campaign,” i.e., the broad front.  General Bernard Law Montgomery at his first press conference in the field in France. (National Archives) From mid-August until the end of the war disagreements would proliferate over precisely what Eisenhower’s armies ought to be doing and where. In September 1944 they revolved around a single issue: “which way to Germany?” Eisenhower believed that both strategically and logistically Montgomery’s narrow front strategy was impractical and would shut down all other transportation and virtually immobilize the preponderance of American forces east of Paris simply to support Montgomery’s 21st Army Group. Eisenhower’s penchant for compromise and consensus led him to approve some of Montgomery’s recommendations. “What Eisenhower was unconsciously counting on was a repetition of November 1918, when the Germans signed the armistice while their armies were still well west of the border. Eisenhower had chosen the safe, cautious route,” notes his official biographer, Stephen Ambrose. Priority of resupply was allocated to 21st Army Group, primarily to enable the British and Canadian armies to capture Antwerp and, equally important, the deadly Crossbow V weapon sites which were now launching the more sophisticated V-2 rocket which struck throughout England without warning. Eisenhower also approved the temporary attachment of Lt. Gen. Courtney Hodges’ First Army, to the fury of Bradley who failed to change his friend’s mind. Their distinctive and disparate personalities and philosophical dissimilarities, and differing styles of leadership separated Eisenhower and Montgomery from one another soon escalated to far more serious proportions. To make his point that a single ground commander was vital, Montgomery even offered to serve under Bradley, never really perceiving Bradley’s total disdain for him. Another misconception is that Montgomery’s sole motivation was to retain the power and prestige of being the Allied ground force commander. Some historians have charged that his offer to serve under Bradley was specious; it was not. Montgomery lacked the guile to make false promises. For all his vanity and at times insufferable insistence on pursuing his own ideas, Montgomery, like Eisenhower, was heartily sick of war and eager to end it quickly. Given the precedent of the independence of the army group commanders, little would have changed with Bradley in command. Eisenhower thus rejected the offer for the same reason he had earlier rebuffed keeping Montgomery: public opinion. The British public, he believed, would not stand for a junior American general in command of a British field marshal and his army group. Eisenhower’s decision to assume command of the ground war unleashed a tide of emotion. It was greeted by the British press as a national slap in the face that was only partly assuaged when Churchill announced Montgomery’s promotion to field marshal on September 1, the official date Eisenhower assumed command of Allied ground forces. Although the decision had been plainly scripted months in advance, it nevertheless came as “an appalling shock” to Montgomery whose promotion seemed to mollify the British public, but did little to mitigate the disappointment over what he regarded as nothing less than a demotion. Eisenhower was in a classic no-win quandary. The American press also criticized him but for not taking command and restoring American prestige, which they maintained was being stolen by Montgomery and the British. If Eisenhower was indecisive over the command issue during and after Cobra (July 1944), a telegram from Army chief of staff, Gen. George Marshall on August 19 settled matters. American correspondents were filing increasingly critical stories of Eisenhower that were receiving prominent space in The New York Times and other high profile newspapers across the United States. Through a censor’s mistake, it had been made public that Bradley was now co-equal with Montgomery. Why were British commanders still running the war in Europe? And, why hadn’t Eisenhower assumed control of the ground war? Marshall’s implication was obvious and, not for the first time a prompting from Marshall stiffened his resolve. Many American officers somewhat cynically viewed Montgomery’s promotion as an unmerited concession by Churchill. Ever the diplomat, Eisenhower smoothed troubled waters at a Whitehall press conference in which he described Montgomery as a “great and personal friend . . . anyone who misinterpreted the transition of command as a demotion for General Montgomery simply did not look the facts in the face . . . Montgomery is one of the great leaders of this or any other war.” Montgomery’s promotion was both a reward for his past successes and also an attempt to keep British prestige from falling any further into the backwash of American supremacy. With Eisenhower’s assumption of command on September 1, Montgomery’s relationship with him took a downward turn. With the change of command the former honeymoon-like atmosphere between the two men completely unraveled. To the point of obsession, Montgomery suffered from an inability to see the points of view of others or to accept that his beliefs were not always shared. He became overwrought in his refusal to accept the reality that Eisenhower intended to take his job. Instead of accepting what Eisenhower constantly preached, that he and everyone else were members of an allied team, Montgomery could not find it in himself to accept Eisenhower’s way of warfare or his authority. The times had changed, but Montgomery had not changed with them, hence his insistence that the present lines of command remain intact. What made the changeover so bitter was Montgomery’s conviction that Eisenhower was too inexperienced and organizationally ill-prepared to assume the mantle of land force commander.  Men of the 378th Infantry Regiment enter the outskirts of Metz, France as Patton's Third U.S. Army continues its fighting in Lorraine. (U.S. Army Center of Military History) Eisenhower was not unresponsive and had there been sufficient supplies forward to increase Third Army’s allocations, he would undoubtedly have turned Patton loose in Lorraine. As it was, before the fuel tap was all but shut off, Eisenhower gave Bradley and Patton fresh hope by allocating 250,000 gallons of fuel to Third Army on September 5 and an additional 1.4 million gallons over the three-day period that followed, before it ground to a halt along the Moselle River, a tantalizing seventy-odd miles from the then unmanned Siegfried Line. Like children squabbling over who gets the last piece of pie, Eisenhower could please no one. His latest generosity on behalf of Patton brought bitter criticism from Montgomery. Still, Eisenhower’s broad-front decision sent a discernible chill through Patton and his Third Army staff and seemed confirmation of his pro-British bias. Convinced the winning of the war was being squandered on the altar of Allied cooperation, Patton frequently lamented that they were fighting two enemies, the Germans and SHAEF, writing to his wife, Bea, “God deliver us from our friends. We can handle the enemy.” The decisions made at this critical moment of the war were, as Patton called it, the “unforgiving minute” of history, which, once taken, could not be easily reversed. “No one realizes the terrible value of the ‘unforgiving minute’ except me,” he seethed in frustration. During the second half of August Bradley and Montgomery took turns lobbying Eisenhower to accept their plan. Eisenhower’s personal relationship with Bradley did not prevent the latter from aggressively entering the fray. His partisan views and his hostility toward Montgomery would at times overwhelm Bradley’s common sense and help fuel Eisenhower’s feelings against the British general. With his increased stature came what he believed should be commensurate clout as an army group commander. Bradley, by his own definition, was “flying high” and in no mood to be relegated to the second string at the expense of his nemesis, Montgomery. Bradley proposed his own plan, a thrust across central and southern France through the Frankfurt gap, and into the heart of the Third Reich by both the First and Third Armies. Third Army would advance into Lorraine and breach the Maginot and Siegfried Lines in the Saar while First Army advanced on an axis to the north, both routes Bradley argued were the most direct ones into the Reich. Eisenhower was beset from all sides by unhappy commanders scrapping for an equal share of the logistical pie. Montgomery’s seemingly endless demands for priority were mirrored by Bradley and Patton who conspired to milk the supply system for all its worth. Caught in the middle was Eisenhower whose authority was challenged repeatedly. For once Bradley set aside his dislike of Patton and willingly supported his efforts to keep Third Army on the move.  Patton's men of the 3d Battalion, 317th Infantry Regiment prepare for an attack across the Moselle River after finally getting their offensive going again. (U.S. Army Center of Military History) Ike’s grandson, David, argues “the thrust of Eisenhower’s position was military,” and that he believed the Germans, while disorganized, were far from beaten. Moreover, Montgomery’s single-thrust plan would actually have made the German defense of the homeland easier by permitting them to concentrate their opposition to the single-thrust advance. “Thus, Montgomery’s talk of defeating the German army and driving to Berlin with forty Allied divisions was ‘fantastic’ – Eisenhower would not ever consider it.” Eisenhower’s assertion that his decisions were made solely for military reasons was not completely valid. Stephen Ambrose notes that, “No matter how brilliant or logical Montgomery’s plan for an advance to the Ruhr was (and a good case can be made that it was both), and no matter what Montgomery’s personality was, under no circumstances would Eisenhower agree to give all the glory to the British, any more than he would agree to give it to American forces. But as things stood Eisenhower could not make his decisions solely on military grounds. He could not halt Patton in his tracks, relegate Bradley to a minor administrative role, and in effect tell Marshall that the great army he had raised in the United States was not needed in Europe.” Although Eisenhower may well have convinced himself his broad front decision was primarily military, the political aspects simply could not have been ignored. 1944 was a presidential election year in a war being fought by allies. From the time he took command of Torch in North Africa his role, indeed the very basis of his success, had been unity in a war, which would be won by allies, not by British or Americans, acting singularly. Thus, from Eisenhower’s perspective, the controversy was a tempest in a teapot. Yet, Montgomery’s single most compelling argument was one which left Eisenhower in a quandary that defied resolution: “If we attempt a compromise solution,” he wrote to the supreme commander on September 4, “and split our maintenance resources so that neither thrust is full-blooded, we will prolong the war.” His memories still bitter after the war, Montgomery said that Eisenhower’s method “was to talk to everyone and then try to work out a compromise solution which would please everyone. He had no plan of his own . . . Eisenhower held conferences to collect ideas; I held conferences to issue orders.” Patton likewise later labeled Eisenhower’s attempts to satisfy everyone by compromise the “momentous error of the war.” Another major point that further muddied the waters was Montgomery’s contention that his offensive encompass forty divisions, a figure wildly beyond the capacity of the logisticians to have supported without the port of Antwerp, which was then still in German hands. The most reasonable figure was a mere twelve divisions. The great argument has focused on whether or not the war would have been shortened had Montgomery’s single thrust strategy prevailed. On this point historians still disagree, as did the logisticians in 1944. Eisenhower questioned, even if given the necessary resources, if Montgomery could have carried out a systematic, aggressive offensive into the Ruhr. He concluded Montgomery could not. The storm brewing between Eisenhower and Montgomery came to a head on September 10 during a tense face-off between the two men. Montgomery had insisted on a meeting and in keeping with his custom that the senior officer should visit his subordinates, Eisenhower readily agreed. The two met aboard Eisenhower’s aircraft parked on the tarmac at Brussels airport. The meeting began innocently enough until Montgomery pulled from his pocket the signals exchanged between them for the past week. The new field marshal wasted no time launching into perhaps the most intemperate and foolish outburst of his career. In language fit for a drill instructor addressing recruits, Montgomery testily condemned everything about Eisenhower’s plan, and why it would not work. Pulling Eisenhower’s recent signals from his pocket, he exclaimed, “They’re balls, sheer balls, rubbish!” Perhaps only Eisenhower would have the forbearance to sit in stony silence while a subordinate verbally assaulted him. When Montgomery at last paused for breath, Eisenhower put his hand on Montgomery’s knee and gently said, “Steady, Monty! You can’t speak to me like that. I’m your boss.” For one of the few times in his career, Montgomery muttered, “I’m sorry, Ike,” and the meeting concluded in less acrimonious fashion, but with neither general giving in to the other. The broad front advance to the Rhine would continue, declared Eisenhower. Eisenhower’s refusal to back Montgomery’s single-thrust plan was not only based on philosophical differences, but on intelligence estimates that the Germans were simply too weak to hold the Siegfried Line or to stop an Allied advance on both the Ruhr and the Saar. Privately, Ike was deeply troubled by the rancorous September 10 meeting. Montgomery’s repeated challenges left him openly questioning his loyalty, and he derided Monty’s plan as a “mere pencil-like thrust” inconsistent with his concept that the war would be fought and won by Allies advancing on a “broad front.” Montgomery’s lack of tact, his frequent letters exhorting Eisenhower to change his mind, and now their face-off in Brussels drove an even deeper wedge in their relations. Montgomery had failed to discern that to attempt to run roughshod over Eisenhower was a waste of time that did more harm than good. Or that behind the calm exterior that permitted free rein to the British field marshal was the unforgiving side of Eisenhower who never forgot the slights and the criticism of his decisions. Montgomery’s pride and his belief in the correctness of his plan left him equally unapologetic. “I’m trying to fight a war, and I can’t help it,” he told his aide. Two proud men that believed in the validity of their cause was a prescription for an impasse. Eisenhower’s great instinct for compromise influenced his decisions during the most critical weeks of the war. Had the logistical support existed without utterly crippling everyone else, there was a strong case to be made for Montgomery’s bold, single-thrust, the ultimate prize being an end to the war in 1944.  British troops made their first penetration into Germany in the Geilenkirchen sector where a combined Anglo-American offensive under command of the British Second Army was launched on the morning of November 18, 1944. (National Archives) The great void between their differing beliefs was never more evident than when, in rejecting Montgomery, Eisenhower said, “The American public would never stand for it; and public opinion wins wars.” To which Montgomery asserted, “Victories win wars. Give people victory and they won’t care who won it.” Both were right but, in the end, the scheme stood no chance in the climate of coalition warfare nurtured by Eisenhower. Not only the months of controversy but also the intrusion of nationalism and outside pressures into the equation brought a certain inevitability to Eisenhower’s decisions. Chester Wilmot has made the case for the British point of view and it is as compelling as it was politically impossible. As supreme commander, Eisenhower “had shown himself to be the military statesman rather than the generalissimo. . . except for one brief period early in the Tunisian Campaign, he had never attempted to exercise direct operational control over his armies.” Instead, Eisenhower had done what he did best, establishing the conditions under which his field commanders carried out his strategic guidance. Eisenhower commanded by consensus and compromise and made the Allied teamwork by dint of his ability to accommodate multi-national interests. “When he could gather his commanders and advisors around a conference table, he had a remarkable capacity for distilling the counsel of many minds into a single solution, but when his commanders were scattered over France he was open to persuasion by the last strong man to whom he talked.” Eisenhower’s voluminous responsibilities were an equally effective argument for retaining a ground commander. The demands on his time and the myriad of problems dumped on his desk for resolution on any given day was staggering. The problems and challenges were endless, but with only a finite number of hours available to Eisenhower to address them. Although civil affairs, administrative matters, and stroking visiting political and military egos all possessed varying degrees of necessity, they often had no direct bearing on the day-to-day problems and responsibilities of a ground force commander. Moreover, without a small operational field headquarters of the sort Marshall would have established, the cumbersome organization of SHAEF simply did not lend itself to managing the battlefield or making decisions in a timely manner.  Eisenhower congratulates Montgomery after presenting him with the Distinguished Service Medal at SHAEF headquarters in June 1945. (National Archives) What was evident but unappreciated by Eisenhower and other key players in the Allied high command in the aftermath of Normandy was the example of earlier campaigns. The German Army was repeatedly shown to be at its most dangerous whenever its back was to the wall or the odds against survival the highest. North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, Anzio, Cassino, and now Normandy were all examples of tenaciously fought battles and campaigns that were soon to be repeated in Holland, Lorraine, and in the forests of the Ardennes and the Hürtgen. Place names that would shortly become prominent on the Allied battle maps: Arnhem, Aachen, Metz, the Reichswald, Elsenborn ridge, Bastogne, and Saint-Vith would prove startling illustrations that the war was far from over.
Tags: 20th century warfare, Historical Figures, Military History, World War II
40 Responses to “A Lingering Controversy: Eisenhower’s ‘Broad Front’ Strategy”Leave a Reply
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I know this is probably simplistic – but why not follow the Russian doctrine of reinforcing success? In other words, reinforce whichever of the two thrusts had more success. Clearly would require more scrambling with regards to logistics, but wouldn’t it have made sense to have a plan where there some of the supplies would be sent to wherever the troops were getting the best results?
It was not question of which success to reinforce, it was a question of logistics. The article barely touches on the potential for an advance by Bradley/Patton south of the Ardennes and through the Saar (another major German industrial area and a traditional invasion route). Or of the US 6th Army Group (with French 1st Army) potential to move cross the Rhine
The problem the Allies were facing was one of supply distribution. It was over 300 miles back to the supply dumps in Normandy and several divisions had already been stripped of trucks to try to keep the advance supplied and moving.
And the political concerns Eisenhower had to deal with were real. The Soviets did not have to deal with a proud ally or the press of democratic nations.
I believe that was Patton’s point. Had he been able to keep up his advance on the Rhein, the german defenses there might have been breached easily. But on the other hand – his men were exhausted, the vehicles in need of repair etc.
What’s that expression about “hindsight”…?
I didn’t word my comment very well. I understand that that was what Patton was advocating. What I should have said, why wasn’t it part of the plan ahead of time to reinforce success? For that matter, why wasn’t it part of American doctrine to do that? As I understood Viktor Suvurov in “Inside the Red Army” Soviet doctrine would be to have units in reserve, and to throw these units into the area of fighting that was showing success, with success defined as making forward progress, without taking casualties into account. In the issue written about here, I don’t believe actual casualties experienced were notably different between Patton’s and Montgomery’s forces.
Several more comments:
1..As I reread the article, I’m left wondering, what did Roosevelt and Churchill talk about in their meetings? You would think the issue of how to utilize the supplies available would be built into the plan to win the war. Given that it wasn’t in this case, why couldn’t the two leaders and their advisers in their capitals arrive at a decision as to the strategy to follow? Hindsight tells me this shouldn’t have been Eisenhower’s decision.
2. Did any German Generals after the war say what they would have done? What would German doctrine have called for?
If you can buy/loan the book by Liddle-Hart “Over the hill” Liddle-Hart interviewed the German Generals in 1946/7 On their view of WW2.
After Normandy when they ( the Germans) were in full retreat, a major attack to northern Germany and on to the Rhur was expected. The Generals as explained to the Author were in no position to oppose the attack.
The book is revealing.Giving the German side of the war.
The comments by the German generals were more than a little self serving and Liddel-Hart was also know to edit to suit his position.
By September 17, 1944, D-Day for Market-Garden, the Germans had enough to stop a single thrust. And it was exactly in this northern area. Maybe you should read Liddel-Hart’s other book, Strategy, and see if an indirect approach by a less obvious (and not as well defended) route would have been a better idea. But that wouldn’t have been under Monty’s command.
The Russian operational doctrine was not regarded as the best model to follow for a more maneuverable, logistically heavier and decentralized Western model of war fighting. The Russians used their system because that’s what worked for a set piece battle with artillery lined up wheels to wheels and everything organized by a central committee or general staff, including logistics and who got reinforced. There were no Pattons in the Russian army, if there were, they died in the Gulag years earlier. Even the best Russian commanders were bound by the security apparatus and Stalin’s infamous habit of intefering with strategy and war plans.
There’s one more consideration against Monty’s strategy. At this point in the war, the British were simply out of manpower. It’s unlikely Britain in particular could have mustered the manpower to sustain the single northern thrust, particularly when you consider the point D’Este makes that the Germans could concentrate against it.
The Bradley strategy through Frankfurt, using US troops, was more feasible from the human capital perspective, although only slightly so due to the problems the US had in moving -infantry- into theater. This came out during the winter when they scrounged the rear area forces for people to man the fighting positions.
The argument for a single ground HQ is compelling, in my view. But another aspect that doesn’t get covered much is the weaknesses and inefficiencies in the US log tail. Someone needs to do a biography/expose of JCH Lee and the CommZ.
Eisenhower was the conductor, and as so had to allow the virtuosos of his “orchestra”-Patton, Monty and Bradley to perform their solos. As he commanded a multinational force and was staff officer commanding combat officers he had to use the managerial approach that he did us. By this point in time of the war, he could slowly bleed the enemy away, and wait for them to attempt something foolhardy and desperate ( which they did! )
Eisenhour was right! Look at the casualties the Russians took capturing Berlin which they then had to share with US We could not in any way have accepted such figures as the Pacific war showed when we took Tarawa etc. Still one can’t help but side with Patton who need a “few miserable gallons of gasoline”
I am not in the same league as the above commentors. However, I am curious as to how Monty’s Operation Market Garden which was conducted one week after the Ike-Montgomery blow up, and was one of the biggest mistakes of WWII, factors in to Ike’s thinking that Monty’s narrow front approach could work. I wouldn’t give Montgomery the time of day. My dad was a lt col for Omar Bradley and had nothing good to say about the field marshall.
The reason for the Failure of Market Garden, was the the Failure of Taking the Nijmegen bridge. The task of taking the bridge was down to the Americans, General Gavin. Gavin failed to understand the principles of attacking a bridge. Which is take both sides at the same time. The bridge should have been taken on D Day September 17th. It took another 36 hours with the help of the xxx corps. Too late for the men in Arnhem.
Great job of parroting the Robin Neilland’s “don’t blame the Brits” apologeta.
This simplistic view of Gavin and the 82nd having the resources to accomplish everything on D-Day is unrealistic. During the planning for the still born Operation Comet, the CG of the 1st Polish Para Brigade pointed out that the tasks in this area called for two Airborne divisions. By the time garden came along there even more to do, the 82nd was tasked with taking multiple bridges, all of them essential. Why was Br 1st Airborne then not dropped on both sides of the Arnhem bridge? Why did they ignore the Driel ferry, the railroad bridge and pontoon bridge as well?
The road bridge at Nijmegen was not given to Gavin as a D-Day objective by any level of command,from 21 AG (Monty) on down, including: British 2nd Army (Dempsey), British I Airborne Corps (Browning; in commonad of the 82nds operations up to contact with the ground forces), or British XXX Corps (Horrocks, in operational control after contact). The first priority for the 82nd was Groesbeck Heights, something EVERYONE agreed on at the time. Neither the ground nor the defenses made a landing on the north side attractive.
Gavin, on his own initiative, provided for a battalion to go for the bridge on D-Day. That it was too little was not Gavin’s fault. The optimistic time table for the advance had Br XXX Corps at Arnhem in two days and the pessimistic in four. XXX Corps arrived at Nijmegen in three days and found the 82nd heavily engaged in both Nijmegen and on the Groesbeck Heights. After a long wait for assault boats (without paddles) for the, the bridge was taken from both ends, the north by US paratroopers and the south by the Br Guards Armoured Division. Horrocks was effusive in his praise of the 82nd afterwards. It then took 18 hours for the Guards to resume the advance. And they were then promptly held up by German defenses on the road to Arnhem.
In any case, the goal of Market-garden was not to relieve Br 1st Airborne and take the southern end of the Arnhem road bridge for them. It was to create a bridge head across the Rhine centered on Apeldorn and resting on the Zuider Zee. Br 21 AG was to then complete the clearing of the Scheldt because there could be no advance to the Ruhr without the shorter supply lines and increased supply capacity provided by Antwerp.
Wouldn’t put to much stock into American brass not liking Montgomery as regards to his generalship. His lt colonel probably didn’t like Bradley. His abrupt manner and no nonsense attitude put American noses out joint on more than few occasions much to the dismay of his seniors. But he was a general in charge of war weary nation and wanted the the thing done and couldn’t stand wasted opportunity. He was to proved right in his concerns on Eisenhowers strategy during the Battle of the Bulge when the only thing thing that saved the situation was the tenacity of the American soldier and Germans own weakness to fully exploit the break through.
If the Americans had decent reserve As Montgomery had advocated and not thrown everything piecemeal as they did the German attack could of been repulsed much easier than it eventually was.
In fact the only reason Germans were able to mount the attack in the first place was because the broad front strategy was was easier to defend which meant they could strip divisions from the frontline to form this offensive reserve. Luckily for the allies by this point Germany was too weak to achieve anything more than temporary success. But still the allies should been calling the shots by this stage not on the defensive.
Wow this is certainly a Monty-centric view of the world. The infallible Montgomery proven right once again!
“If the Americans had decent reserve As Montgomery had advocated and not thrown everything piecemeal as they did …”
The US 12th AG had a very long front to defend, US units were not thrown in piecemeal. The Ardennes was the sector least suitable to offensive operations. Bradley accepted the risk on the US VIII Corps front, reasoning that an attack could be stopped at the Meuse, in which he was proven right. As part of hte risk management, Patton had plans for a rapid move to the sector to help stop such an attack, in which he was proven right.
One reason there was a shortage of troops at the front was because logistical considerations limited the number of divisions that could be supported. Antwerp was not opened by Br 21st AG until the end of November. The SHAEF strategic reserve, the US 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions, recently released from their attachment to Br 21st AG, played a major role in stopping the offensive.
A lot of what you say is true but it does not address the key issue which how the Germans were able to amass such a large reserve. The broad front policy made this possible.
As for the issue of lack of supplies meaning that the front was thinly manned, your right but that also reinforces exactly why the broad front strategy should of been avoided. If resources are scarce they must focused at one spot at a time to keep the enemy off balance forcing them to move their mobile reserves to each breakthrough, forcing them to use their precious fuel and bringing them out into the open so that the allies air power could inflict even more damage on them.
But instead they pursued the attack everywhere all at once or Broad front strategy which became bogged down into static warfare which suited the Germans who were largely on foot or horse back by this point. This allowed Hitler the freedom to release his last mobile reserves for this massive counter stroke.
In the end the Ardennes offensive did two things, firstly showed what concentration of force could do even by a severely weakened foe and secondly forced the allies to rethink what they were doing making them much more potent force.
In round about way the Germans did the allies a favor by exposing their last mobile reserves to allied airpower thus handing them a situation they had failed to create for themselves.
A concentrated thrust would also mean concentrated casualties.
Heavy losses confined to the troops of just one nation would be a huge political liability.
Montgomery’s concept was of a concentrated mass of Allied armour, with all available logistical support devoted to it, directed against the Ruhr, a threat which would force the remaining German armour to give battle, and then let the great Allied superiority in armour and air power destroy it.
When you have that level of superiority, what you need is a large set battle to exploit it. If this basic concept had been applied, the German armour would have been forced to come out and fight for the Ruhr, just as the Japanese navy was forced to come out and fight for Leyte. Once the German armour was finished, the road to Berlin then really would lie open.
But how to approach the Ruhr, to create this threat? In the east, the country was difficult, with hills and forests. In the west, on the Allied left, lay the Low Countries and the north German plains: that was where to make the flanking move.
This was the Schlieffen plan in reverse: a wide flanking move to reach round and stab the enemy in his industrial heartland. The appearance of the mass of Allied armour on their west flank heading round towards the Ruhr would inevitably force the German armour to come to meet it. The Allies would then be able to fight their decisive tank and air battle, on those same flat plains.
It is worth noting that the Germans used the Schlieffen plan, or a variant of it, in each world war. Each time, their idea was an outflanking move in the west, sweeping round through the Low Countries, not a broad front advance. This shows that, in strategic terms, the German General Staff agreed with Monty — or it shows that Monty copied the Germans.
The Schlieffen plan went wrong in WW1, because while the German right flank advanced through the Low Countries, the left flank failed to play their part, which was to give way on the front of Alsace-Lorraine. That retreat would have drawn the French forward there, reinforcing their “success”, thus leaving no reserves in the centre against the decisive German push coming round from the west.
In the event, the German left flank fought forward from Alsace-Lorraine, thus compressing and concentrating the French forces, instead of extending and weakening them. This was in effect a political decision by the Germans, who refused, when push came to shove, to let the French advance onto German territory.
Montgomery’s plan was also defeated politically. Monty’s idea was to halt Patton’s advance in the east, and take all his logistic support to be used for the massive armoured advance in the west. Strategically, this concept was right, but politically, it failed, because the Americans would not accept the grounding of Patton’s forces.
Thus both the Germans in WW1, and the Allies in WW2, had the correct flanking strategy on the table in front of them, but in each case the political will was not there to follow the military logic through.
This is a well reasoned idea but it fails to account for the sizes of the forces involved and the ability of the allies to supply them in a forward combat zone. Any advance without first opening Antwerp was only going to make the situation more difficult to maintain.
It would appear that 10-20 divisions could have been supported, and that only at the expense of stopping all other movement on the front (and stripping some units of transport), and presenting the Germans with an opportunity to strike at immobile forces. Certainly not the 40 divisions advocated by Montgomery, which incidentally was more than the entire allied force in Normandy up to August.
If Montgomery had advanced with 20 divisions, into an area full with of barriers, then it is not unreasonable to speculate that the Germans could have stopped it with as little as 7-10 divisions due to the advantages of the defense. There would have been no pressure elsewhere on the front to draw off German reserves. The record of the Western Allies in tank combat, particularly the British cavalry charge doctrine still in evidence as late as Goodwood, was not in favor of an allied success in a single great decisive armored battle.
The German general staff may not have been totally in accord with Montgomery, the German general staff normally advocated a concentric attack, so they may have preferred Eisenhower’s approach of attacking the Ruhr from north and south.
I think people are confusing Soviet operational and strategic practice. Because while the Soviets did concentrate force on an operational level they did pursue a broad front strategy. In general they staggered their strategic offensives so that important resources such as artillery corps and logistical support would back the current drive. The problem with applying this concept to the Western Front is that the Soviets after 1943 no longer entertained the notion of winning the war in a single blow which an alternative plan in the West had to achieve.
As for the Schlieffen plan reference I don’t think it applies because the whole point of the plan was to outflank the French positions on a very broad front, not the idea of concentrating force to break through enemy defense but rather extend the front enough so that a frontal attack can be avoided. The decisive factor was not the physical terrain or the distance but the lack of French presence. Considering that the Germans did have defenses in the area I don’t think the considerations apply.
Montgomery’s intention was that the superior Allied armour should be concentrated and advance before the Germans could properly regroup following the defeat in Normandy. Given the Allied predominance, the need was to bring the remaining German armoured strength to battle as soon as possible and destroy it. Monty maintained there was a window of opportunity for this, but it passed without the necessary decision being made.
Once Eisenhower had rejected Monty’s approach, and the Germans had regrouped , the opportunity was gone, and it then became a matter of battering through German defences, army by army on a broad front. The Allies now had no concentration of strength anywhere along the line. This dispersed strategy suited the defence.
A massed force of armour advancing before German defences were organised could have penetrated to the north German plain, and then swung round to attack the Ruhr. This would have forced the German armour to mass against it. The Germans would have had no room for manoeuvre. They would have been compelled to stand in front of the Ruhr in an open set piece battle, and would have been destroyed where they stood by the superior Allied armour and air forces.
Then not only would the road to Berlin have been open, but the Allies would have taken the Ruhr, bringing much of Germany’s war production to a stop. Montgomery believed this plan could have ended the war in 1944.
The opportunity had already passed by September 10, possibly as early as September 5, and Montgomery was not ready to advance any earlier. An advance beyond the Rhine wasn’t going to happen until Antwerp was open. The allies simply could not support a major battle another 100 miles beyond Antwerp. Eisenhower was right, it would have ended in disaster.
While Tom Black’s argument that the allies 199 September 1944 of using a reverse Schlieffen plan in the low countries has some merit, I believe it would have not been a success. The concept is unsound as it fails to take into account a number of factors which would deny overall success for such an operation.
Firstly, Operation Market Garden clearly showed the problems the massed allied armour would have faced in that geographic region. Historically, that area of operations was poor terrain for free ranging armour, which needs the freedom to manoeuvre and exploit any gaps or weaknesses in the enemy line of battle. This was not available to the allies as evidenced by the failure of 30th Corps push in Market Garden. The single highway that 30 Corps was forced to rely and operate on plus the need to capture 3 crucial bridges over the main rivers meant that the allies would have to look elsewhere for better ground in which to bring the Werhmacht to a decisive armour clash.
Secondly Operation Goodwood, the British attempt to break out from Caen in July 18 1944, proved to be a disaster for the Brits. Three of the top British armoured Divisions, The Guards, 7th (Desert Rats) & 11th Armour, all lost 469 tanks over 3 days of combat (18 July to 20 July). In addition, VII Corps losing 199 tanks over two days. This showed that the allies did not have superior armour in any form at all as stated by Tom. The Panther, Tiger and the old workhorse, Panzer MkIV had the edge. It also clearly shows that the Germans were masters of defence and limited counter attack. Although numerically outnumbered by allied armour and being vulnerable from allied air attack meant that the Germans gave the allies and specifically Monty, a very bloody nose over those few days of carnage in Normandy.
Now, take that example and expand it to the reverse Schlieffen plan massed armour plan. If there was a massed armoured thrust attempted by the allies in September 1944, and not necessarily in the low countries, then there is good enough evidence and history to hypothesize that such a battle would have resulted in another Goodwood for the allies, regardless of their numerically superiority in AFV’s or air supremacy.
Finally the Germans were falling back to pre-prepared positions and although it is often said that the German army in Western Europe after Falaise was in a rout, they were able to quickly redeploy and stand and fight when necessary as shown in Market Garden. Additionally the Germans had better tanks and tactical doctrine which the allies had learned bitterly in Normandy. They would have regrouped, dispersed their resources and used the terrain and given the allies another bloody nose. Also, I seriously doubt they would have done what the allies or Tom Black had hoped, that is concentrate their Panzer reserves into a massed formation for the allies to engage. The old adage is that never expect or rely on the enemy to do as you plan.
So therefore while it looks sound as a concept, to try to bring a massed German armoured response to a decisive battle via a reverse Schlieffen plan using massed allied armour, I believe such an operation would have ended in a costly failure for the allies. Also, trying to seek a decisive battle is the dream of every commander but such engagements rarely occur and so I think Ike was right in pursuing the broad front approach.
Good wood was never seriously meant to be a breakout. It was more a operation to hold german panzer and armoured units on there front so Patton and Bradley could breakout on their front. The Brits could accept large losses of tanks and if it held the Germans in place not to mention it chewed up some of Hitlers best mechanised units which could not be replaced.
The Russian were to copy this stratedy later on but on a much larger scale.
If Goodwood was not meant to be a breakout, but only a holding operation, then it was vastly overdone and used far more resources than it should have. It also did not pin down the German panzers, they were still able to concentrate for the Mortain counter attack.
True the Germans were able to counter which shows what well oiled machine their army was but it does not mean the Brits failed. The spectacular success of Patton’s advance in the first instance is proof of this. He could not achieved what he did if those German armored
units had been available to check his advance.
Patton’s armored thrusts eventually petered out because his advances were beyond his means and his forces became disjointed and spread out on different missions losing their momentum and ultimately their ability to conduct offensive operations on any large scale.
In hindsight, the best course of action might have been to hesitate and NOT use up resources on Market Garden. This would have led to exactly what happened next – Hitler’s overly-optimistic counter-attack through the Ardennes. This, in turn, used up german resources and opened up for the final allied offensive into Germany the next spring.
There is usually no “quick-fix” in a war – the other guy always proves to be more willing to fight, has better weapons and the terrain is much more difficult in reality than was expected in the plan. Plans, however, needs to be “sold” to superior officers and sometimes politicians, meaning the most be of a positive nature (especially if there are other plans, competing for the same logistical resources).
Broad front — or big left hook?
Nikolai is surely right to say the Soviet conduct of the eastern front is not directly relevant here. There you had a campaign on a continental scale, with no short route to the enemy’s heartland, over a front far wider and potentially far more elastic.
The western front was much shorter, its ends closed by the Alps and the Channel. It was on a national scale, and the proximity of France and Germany meant a successful advance could reach the enemy’s vital heart very quickly. The Germans took advantage of this in 1940 to knock France out in a matter of weeks. The Allies, after Normandy, could have done the same to Germany in 1944.
But how? The basic problem is that if you cover the whole front, then you spread yourself thin and are strong nowhere. Conversely, if you obey the fundamental military rule of concentration in one place, that lets you generate your full strength, but you can no longer cover the whole line.
This inescapable dilemma hands the advantage to the attacker. The defence must try to be strong enough everywhere (impossible), the offence only has to be strong enough in one place (quite achievable) in order to break through.
That is the basic reason why Montgomery’s plan for a big left hook was right and the broad front advance was wrong. The imperative of the defensive meant the Germans had no choice but to accept spreading their forces and being strong nowhere. The Allies, however, had the option of massing their force in an overwhelming concentration on one sector of the front, but they chose not to do it.
The first thing wrong with this is that the “Broad Front” strategy is misrepresented. As D’Este says, Eisenhower’s plan was based on U.S. Grant’s 1864 campaign plan, whihc could be paraphrased for 1944 as follows:
To use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed forces of the enemy, preventing him from using the same force at different times against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of [rest] for refitting and producing the necessary supplies for carrying on resistance; second, to hammer continuously against the armed forces of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if no other way, there should be nothing left for him but to surrender.
Eisenhower’s plan was not, as it is sometimes presented by some writer’s, a feeble pushing everywhere all the time, but to have each Army Group, and each Army, attack a point that the enemy has to defend. Which is not that difficult when your opponent is Hitler defending everything.
I agree with Tyrone Lambert that it is important to look at The Battle of the Bulge to help understand the situation being discussed. In that case, the Germans were defeated and were still able to hold their western frontier for several more months (Granted it was winter so offensive operations much harder).
The more I think about I also agree the allies did pursue the correct strategy: they kept fighting on their two axis of attack until they reached the limit of logistics. The way to end the war quicker was not to slow down the advance. Also, they were trying to win before having to face another winter.
Limit of logistics obviously means petroleum products. It would be interesting to see at what point the allies could have had enough oil to not run out and what course of action. Was it refined products, so if less had been used in Italy or the Pacific would they not have run out? Was it transport to the European shore, was it distribution on the continent, or was the advance so quick the infrastructure could not keep up? Probably in hindsight such a decision would have to have been in 1942, which would have been unrealistic“given the military situation at the time.
I feel several good comments have been made here however Mr Tyrone Lambert’s comment that Operation Goodwood highlights the complete ineffectiveness of the Allied armour is flawed, does not incorporate important factors and has overblown the Allied losses. Latest research conducted, by Simon Trew and co, place total losses around the 150 mark for VIII Corps and around 20 tanks for the support attacks by the Canadians and 3rd Infantry. No one doubts other tanks were damaged but the losses were not of the magnitude described.
Additionally the Germans knew the attack was coming, had fortified the area extensively and counterattacked with several panzer divisions and lost up to 100 tanks themselves in the process; the attack effectively destroyed several panzer divisions ability to resist while the British divisions were able to continue the offensive several days later with Operation Spring before being redeployed across the front for Bluecoat.
If anything, Goodwood highlights that the comment of drawing the German tanks into a decisive battle and defeating them was very well much a possibility by the Allied forces. It was achieved at the Second Battle of El Alamein and it was achieved near Caen during Goodwood.
Would logistic problems have defeated Monty’s big left hook?
If I may put in another word, the question of logistics is often raised. The Allies in autumn 1944 had great strength in manpower, armour and all equipment, but prior to opening up a large Channel port, it was impossible to bring all their strength to bear on the front line.
Eisenhower stated this problem meant Montgomery’s planned thrust could not have been maintained logistically. Carlo d’Este echoes that view. However, Monty’s plan, if implemented as he intended, would actually have solved the logistic problem more swiftly than any other approach.
First, you take all the armour and motorised units of four armies (Crerar, Dempsey, Simpson, Hodges) and make one mobile attacking force, under a single commander (Montgomery or Bradley). Secondly, you take the logistic resources (engineers, pioneers, transport, fuel, etc.) of five armies (the above four plus Patton) and use them to support the attack. You send this mighty force driving ahead on the left wing through Belgium and Holland, leaving non-motorised troops behind in static defence.
The attacking force is now more mobile than ever, because it is 100% motorised, and has more fuel than ever, because it has five armies’ worth of fuel in place of four. At the same time, the combined engineering and pioneer resources of five armies give it the ability to surmount rapidly any and all physical obstacles it may meet. It is also easier to resupply these forces, as they are all in one place, not dispersed on a wide front. In this way, the immediate logistic problems are solved.
The nub of the matter is this: the amount of fuel and resources initially available under Ike’s plan and Monty’s plan is the same. As events showed, that amount was sufficient to let five entire armies move forward steadily in line abreast along the whole front. If you extract the armour and mass it in one sector, and give it all the fuel and support, you can then drive that smaller but much more powerful force ahead a lot faster and a lot further.
What can the enemy now do against this fast-striding behemoth? Any German armoured force in or near its path faces a sharp dilemma: either fight where you stand (suicide) or withdraw to concentrate with other units (surrendering territory). The only logical course for the German armoured and mobile units is to withdraw, pull together whatever strength they have and postpone battle until it becomes unavoidable.
However, it is quite possible that Hitler, initially at least, would have issued non-withdrawal orders. In that case, each Panzer force would have been destroyed in turn as it came up against the Mighty Mobile. Either way, the Allied advance would rapidly clear the Low Countries of German armour. Now Antwerp and other ports could be opened up.
In this scenario, German occupying troops left stranded by the disappearance of their armour and supplies would no doubt resist for a time and would sabotage and destroy port facilities as much as they could (as happened in the actual event). However, the difference in this case is, first, the time they have available for sabotage is less, because the clearance of the region has been that much quicker, and secondly, the resources the Allies have for repairing facilities are that much greater (five armies’ engineers instead of one or two).
As a result, Antwerp and other ports would have been in operational use by the Allies a good deal earlier than actually happened, and the Allied thrust would have been reinforced all the more.
This is the only place I have seen it argued that Monty’s “Mighty Host” was to be composed entirely of armored divisions.
As of September 5 there were 12 armored divisions (6 US, 3 British,1 Canadian, 1 Polish and 1 French) on the continent, spread across the continent. To move and assemble them in one group on the 21 AG front would take some time (at least a few days) and use much of the fuel available. And during this assembly time the Germans would be able to rest and refit (as they did before Market-Garden, but without any pressure at all this time). An allied armored division during an advance required something like 300-600 tons a day depending on opposition. This would have required something like 2000 trucks.
The “Mighty Host” is then to advance 400 miles to Berlin, and to fight a major, climatic battle on the way defeating the strength of the German Army while moving ever further away from Allied air power and leaving the rest of the Allied armies immobile and vulnerable and the supply path of the “Mighty Host” unprotected.
This somehow improves the supply situation adn ends the war in 1944?
The Germans never saw bold arrows on a situation map as anything other than an opportunity. If this was Monty’s “full blooded thrust” it probably would have ended in disaster (Eisenhower’s fear) and resulted in meeting the Soviets on the Rhine.
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No one has mentioned 7th army, which later became 6th army group, in southern France. If Eisenhower had allowed it Devers, commanding 6th army group, could have jumped the Rhine in November 1944. There was little organized German defense at that point. Further, Eisenhower was siphoning supplies from 6th AG to support the northern advance. Which implies that Devers could have potentially moved faster than he was able to historically.
It was a bit of a strategic mess really. I think Mage makes a good point about the Southern France invasion.
Generally speaking I think it points up the deficiencies of the Normandy option – it was such a long way from the Normandy beaches to the heart of German power. Supply issues closed off the options.
One always wonders what geopolitical objectives were in play. The backdrop of the Allied invasion of Western Europe was not to just liberate Europe from the Nazis, but to also keep the Soviet Union from grabbing it. While Ike’s generals might have been focused on the goal of simply knocking Germany out of the war, Ike’s bosses – essentially Roosevelt and Churchill, might have been looking more broadly.
Things are not so simple at that level. Stalin had already switched sides once in the war and despite the appalling losses, could have arguably declared victory once he had expelled the Germans from Russia. While that was something of a hollow threat against prior to D-Day, once the the US and UK were on the board in Europe, Stalin had had genuine leverage. The mere risk of so many German divisions coming from the East had to have weighed on Russia.
In a similar vein, whose to say that Stalin’s Red Army would even stop after German? In that sense, a single narrow thrust into Germany from some particularly direction – either by Monty or Patton, might have knocked Germany out of the war, but would have also exposed the Allies to a flanking attack by the Russians. Only a united and broad offensive, with not 40 divisions up against the Soviet frontier, but, ALL of the Allied divisions, with ALL of western europe behind its back, would have prevented that. Do you think Ike could have a press conference of even allow anyone as important as a general to think that the USA and UK were concerned about the possibility of a war with the Soviet Union?
So yes, if the Soviet Union were a like minded western ally, then Monty or Patton should have been given the gasoline and sent on their way. But the Soviet Union wasn’t, and so Ike’s broad advance was in fact the best way to go.
Ugh lack of sleep… meant to write, so many German divisions freed up from the east had to weigh on the West.
This whole debate is silly, and illustrates exactly what went wrong at the time. Eisenhower’s and Montgomery’s bosses had already decided that Anvil should happen (the invasion of southern France), so it wasn’t even a matter for Eisenhower or Montgomery what strategy to follow. There was to be an advance into Germany on a broad front that extended from the North Sea to The Alps. Basta.
Montgomery should have realised this was the case, but for some inexplicable reason refused to accept it. In his defence, it has to be said he was pressed time and again to have Eisenhower agree to any strategy at all; this happened in preparation for the invasion of Sicily, and of Italy, and yet again in the preparations for Overlord. For Pete’s sake, you don’t just invade Normandy, have a fight with the Germans, and only only once you are sure to have won decide what to do next. Victory in battle provides a momentum with which to enter the next battle, and Montgomery was right, you must plan two or more battles ahead.
I think there is too much nationalism in this whole debate. Weren’t Eisenhower’s problems with Patton equally as severe as those with Montgomery? Why isn’t that mentioned? We today lose sight of the horror of WW2, and for my part, I am satisfied merely with the Allies having defeated the evil that was German National Socialism.