I know this is probably simplistic – but why not follow the Russian doctrine of reinforcing success? In other words, reinforce whichever of the two thrusts had more success. Clearly would require more scrambling with regards to logistics, but wouldn’t it have made sense to have a plan where there some of the supplies would be sent to wherever the troops were getting the best results?

By Tony Tramonte on Oct 7, 2009 at 6:53 pm

I believe that was Patton’s point. Had he been able to keep up his advance on the Rhein, the german defenses there might have been breached easily. But on the other hand – his men were exhausted, the vehicles in need of repair etc.
What’s that expression about “hindsight”…?

By Fredrik on Oct 9, 2009 at 8:27 am

I didn’t word my comment very well. I understand that that was what Patton was advocating. What I should have said, why wasn’t it part of the plan ahead of time to reinforce success? For that matter, why wasn’t it part of American doctrine to do that? As I understood Viktor Suvurov in “Inside the Red Army” Soviet doctrine would be to have units in reserve, and to throw these units into the area of fighting that was showing success, with success defined as making forward progress, without taking casualties into account. In the issue written about here, I don’t believe actual casualties experienced were notably different between Patton’s and Montgomery’s forces.

By Tony Tramonte on Oct 9, 2009 at 12:42 pm

Several more comments:

1..As I reread the article, I’m left wondering, what did Roosevelt and Churchill talk about in their meetings? You would think the issue of how to utilize the supplies available would be built into the plan to win the war. Given that it wasn’t in this case, why couldn’t the two leaders and their advisers in their capitals arrive at a decision as to the strategy to follow? Hindsight tells me this shouldn’t have been Eisenhower’s decision.

2. Did any German Generals after the war say what they would have done? What would German doctrine have called for?

By Tony Tramonte on Oct 9, 2009 at 1:17 pm

The Russian operational doctrine was not regarded as the best model to follow for a more maneuverable, logistically heavier and decentralized Western model of war fighting. The Russians used their system because that’s what worked for a set piece battle with artillery lined up wheels to wheels and everything organized by a central committee or general staff, including logistics and who got reinforced. There were no Pattons in the Russian army, if there were, they died in the Gulag years earlier. Even the best Russian commanders were bound by the security apparatus and Stalin’s infamous habit of intefering with strategy and war plans.

By Wilson on Oct 16, 2009 at 11:07 pm

There’s one more consideration against Monty’s strategy. At this point in the war, the British were simply out of manpower. It’s unlikely Britain in particular could have mustered the manpower to sustain the single northern thrust, particularly when you consider the point D’Este makes that the Germans could concentrate against it.

The Bradley strategy through Frankfurt, using US troops, was more feasible from the human capital perspective, although only slightly so due to the problems the US had in moving -infantry- into theater. This came out during the winter when they scrounged the rear area forces for people to man the fighting positions.

The argument for a single ground HQ is compelling, in my view. But another aspect that doesn’t get covered much is the weaknesses and inefficiencies in the US log tail. Someone needs to do a biography/expose of JCH Lee and the CommZ.

By David Emery on Oct 20, 2009 at 10:33 am

Eisenhower was the conductor, and as so had to allow the virtuosos of his “orchestra”-Patton, Monty and Bradley to perform their solos. As he commanded a multinational force and was staff officer commanding combat officers he had to use the managerial approach that he did us. By this point in time of the war, he could slowly bleed the enemy away, and wait for them to attempt something foolhardy and desperate ( which they did! )

By paul penrod on Oct 20, 2009 at 4:14 pm

Eisenhour was right! Look at the casualties the Russians took capturing Berlin which they then had to share with US We could not in any way have accepted such figures as the Pacific war showed when we took Tarawa etc. Still one can’t help but side with Patton who need a “few miserable gallons of gasoline”

By charles matejic on Oct 20, 2009 at 5:01 pm

I am not in the same league as the above commentors. However, I am curious as to how Monty’s Operation Market Garden which was conducted one week after the Ike-Montgomery blow up, and was one of the biggest mistakes of WWII, factors in to Ike’s thinking that Monty’s narrow front approach could work. I wouldn’t give Montgomery the time of day. My dad was a lt col for Omar Bradley and had nothing good to say about the field marshall.

By mark davis on Oct 20, 2009 at 5:30 pm

A concentrated thrust would also mean concentrated casualties.
Heavy losses confined to the troops of just one nation would be a huge political liability.

By James McCoy on Oct 20, 2009 at 6:45 pm

Montgomery’s concept was of a concentrated mass of Allied armour, with all available logistical support devoted to it, directed against the Ruhr, a threat which would force the remaining German armour to give battle, and then let the great Allied superiority in armour and air power destroy it.

When you have that level of superiority, what you need is a large set battle to exploit it. If this basic concept had been applied, the German armour would have been forced to come out and fight for the Ruhr, just as the Japanese navy was forced to come out and fight for Leyte. Once the German armour was finished, the road to Berlin then really would lie open.

But how to approach the Ruhr, to create this threat? In the east, the country was difficult, with hills and forests. In the west, on the Allied left, lay the Low Countries and the north German plains: that was where to make the flanking move.

This was the Schlieffen plan in reverse: a wide flanking move to reach round and stab the enemy in his industrial heartland. The appearance of the mass of Allied armour on their west flank heading round towards the Ruhr would inevitably force the German armour to come to meet it. The Allies would then be able to fight their decisive tank and air battle, on those same flat plains.

It is worth noting that the Germans used the Schlieffen plan, or a variant of it, in each world war. Each time, their idea was an outflanking move in the west, sweeping round through the Low Countries, not a broad front advance. This shows that, in strategic terms, the German General Staff agreed with Monty — or it shows that Monty copied the Germans.

The Schlieffen plan went wrong in WW1, because while the German right flank advanced through the Low Countries, the left flank failed to play their part, which was to give way on the front of Alsace-Lorraine. That retreat would have drawn the French forward there, reinforcing their “success”, thus leaving no reserves in the centre against the decisive German push coming round from the west.

In the event, the German left flank fought forward from Alsace-Lorraine, thus compressing and concentrating the French forces, instead of extending and weakening them. This was in effect a political decision by the Germans, who refused, when push came to shove, to let the French advance onto German territory.

Montgomery’s plan was also defeated politically. Monty’s idea was to halt Patton’s advance in the east, and take all his logistic support to be used for the massive armoured advance in the west. Strategically, this concept was right, but politically, it failed, because the Americans would not accept the grounding of Patton’s forces.

Thus both the Germans in WW1, and the Allies in WW2, had the correct flanking strategy on the table in front of them, but in each case the political will was not there to follow the military logic through.

By Tom Black on Oct 21, 2009 at 10:04 am

I think people are confusing Soviet operational and strategic practice. Because while the Soviets did concentrate force on an operational level they did pursue a broad front strategy. In general they staggered their strategic offensives so that important resources such as artillery corps and logistical support would back the current drive. The problem with applying this concept to the Western Front is that the Soviets after 1943 no longer entertained the notion of winning the war in a single blow which an alternative plan in the West had to achieve.

As for the Schlieffen plan reference I don’t think it applies because the whole point of the plan was to outflank the French positions on a very broad front, not the idea of concentrating force to break through enemy defense but rather extend the front enough so that a frontal attack can be avoided. The decisive factor was not the physical terrain or the distance but the lack of French presence. Considering that the Germans did have defenses in the area I don’t think the considerations apply.

By Nikolai on Oct 21, 2009 at 6:32 pm

Montgomery’s intention was that the superior Allied armour should be concentrated and advance before the Germans could properly regroup following the defeat in Normandy. Given the Allied predominance, the need was to bring the remaining German armoured strength to battle as soon as possible and destroy it. Monty maintained there was a window of opportunity for this, but it passed without the necessary decision being made.

Once Eisenhower had rejected Monty’s approach, and the Germans had regrouped , the opportunity was gone, and it then became a matter of battering through German defences, army by army on a broad front. The Allies now had no concentration of strength anywhere along the line. This dispersed strategy suited the defence.

A massed force of armour advancing before German defences were organised could have penetrated to the north German plain, and then swung round to attack the Ruhr. This would have forced the German armour to mass against it. The Germans would have had no room for manoeuvre. They would have been compelled to stand in front of the Ruhr in an open set piece battle, and would have been destroyed where they stood by the superior Allied armour and air forces.

Then not only would the road to Berlin have been open, but the Allies would have taken the Ruhr, bringing much of Germany’s war production to a stop. Montgomery believed this plan could have ended the war in 1944.

By Tom Black on Oct 21, 2009 at 7:39 pm

While Tom Black’s argument that the allies 199 September 1944 of using a reverse Schlieffen plan in the low countries has some merit, I believe it would have not been a success. The concept is unsound as it fails to take into account a number of factors which would deny overall success for such an operation.

Firstly, Operation Market Garden clearly showed the problems the massed allied armour would have faced in that geographic region. Historically, that area of operations was poor terrain for free ranging armour, which needs the freedom to manoeuvre and exploit any gaps or weaknesses in the enemy line of battle. This was not available to the allies as evidenced by the failure of 30th Corps push in Market Garden. The single highway that 30 Corps was forced to rely and operate on plus the need to capture 3 crucial bridges over the main rivers meant that the allies would have to look elsewhere for better ground in which to bring the Werhmacht to a decisive armour clash.

Secondly Operation Goodwood, the British attempt to break out from Caen in July 18 1944, proved to be a disaster for the Brits. Three of the top British armoured Divisions, The Guards, 7th (Desert Rats) & 11th Armour, all lost 469 tanks over 3 days of combat (18 July to 20 July). In addition, VII Corps losing 199 tanks over two days. This showed that the allies did not have superior armour in any form at all as stated by Tom. The Panther, Tiger and the old workhorse, Panzer MkIV had the edge. It also clearly shows that the Germans were masters of defence and limited counter attack. Although numerically outnumbered by allied armour and being vulnerable from allied air attack meant that the Germans gave the allies and specifically Monty, a very bloody nose over those few days of carnage in Normandy.

Now, take that example and expand it to the reverse Schlieffen plan massed armour plan. If there was a massed armoured thrust attempted by the allies in September 1944, and not necessarily in the low countries, then there is good enough evidence and history to hypothesize that such a battle would have resulted in another Goodwood for the allies, regardless of their numerically superiority in AFV’s or air supremacy.

Finally the Germans were falling back to pre-prepared positions and although it is often said that the German army in Western Europe after Falaise was in a rout, they were able to quickly redeploy and stand and fight when necessary as shown in Market Garden. Additionally the Germans had better tanks and tactical doctrine which the allies had learned bitterly in Normandy. They would have regrouped, dispersed their resources and used the terrain and given the allies another bloody nose. Also, I seriously doubt they would have done what the allies or Tom Black had hoped, that is concentrate their Panzer reserves into a massed formation for the allies to engage. The old adage is that never expect or rely on the enemy to do as you plan.

So therefore while it looks sound as a concept, to try to bring a massed German armoured response to a decisive battle via a reverse Schlieffen plan using massed allied armour, I believe such an operation would have ended in a costly failure for the allies. Also, trying to seek a decisive battle is the dream of every commander but such engagements rarely occur and so I think Ike was right in pursuing the broad front approach.

By Tyrone Lambert on Oct 23, 2009 at 1:57 am

In hindsight, the best course of action might have been to hesitate and NOT use up resources on Market Garden. This would have led to exactly what happened next – Hitler’s overly-optimistic counter-attack through the Ardennes. This, in turn, used up german resources and opened up for the final allied offensive into Germany the next spring.

There is usually no “quick-fix” in a war – the other guy always proves to be more willing to fight, has better weapons and the terrain is much more difficult in reality than was expected in the plan. Plans, however, needs to be “sold” to superior officers and sometimes politicians, meaning the most be of a positive nature (especially if there are other plans, competing for the same logistical resources).

By Fredrik on Oct 23, 2009 at 8:04 am

Broad front — or big left hook?

Nikolai is surely right to say the Soviet conduct of the eastern front is not directly relevant here. There you had a campaign on a continental scale, with no short route to the enemy’s heartland, over a front far wider and potentially far more elastic.

The western front was much shorter, its ends closed by the Alps and the Channel. It was on a national scale, and the proximity of France and Germany meant a successful advance could reach the enemy’s vital heart very quickly. The Germans took advantage of this in 1940 to knock France out in a matter of weeks. The Allies, after Normandy, could have done the same to Germany in 1944.

But how? The basic problem is that if you cover the whole front, then you spread yourself thin and are strong nowhere. Conversely, if you obey the fundamental military rule of concentration in one place, that lets you generate your full strength, but you can no longer cover the whole line.

This inescapable dilemma hands the advantage to the attacker. The defence must try to be strong enough everywhere (impossible), the offence only has to be strong enough in one place (quite achievable) in order to break through.

That is the basic reason why Montgomery’s plan for a big left hook was right and the broad front advance was wrong. The imperative of the defensive meant the Germans had no choice but to accept spreading their forces and being strong nowhere. The Allies, however, had the option of massing their force in an overwhelming concentration on one sector of the front, but they chose not to do it.

By Tom Black on Oct 24, 2009 at 7:32 am

I agree with Tyrone Lambert that it is important to look at The Battle of the Bulge to help understand the situation being discussed. In that case, the Germans were defeated and were still able to hold their western frontier for several more months (Granted it was winter so offensive operations much harder).

The more I think about I also agree the allies did pursue the correct strategy: they kept fighting on their two axis of attack until they reached the limit of logistics. The way to end the war quicker was not to slow down the advance. Also, they were trying to win before having to face another winter.

Limit of logistics obviously means petroleum products. It would be interesting to see at what point the allies could have had enough oil to not run out and what course of action. Was it refined products, so if less had been used in Italy or the Pacific would they not have run out? Was it transport to the European shore, was it distribution on the continent, or was the advance so quick the infrastructure could not keep up? Probably in hindsight such a decision would have to have been in 1942, which would have been unrealistic“given the military situation at the time.

By Tony Tramonte on Oct 24, 2009 at 8:40 am

I feel several good comments have been made here however Mr Tyrone Lambert’s comment that Operation Goodwood highlights the complete ineffectiveness of the Allied armour is flawed, does not incorporate important factors and has overblown the Allied losses. Latest research conducted, by Simon Trew and co, place total losses around the 150 mark for VIII Corps and around 20 tanks for the support attacks by the Canadians and 3rd Infantry. No one doubts other tanks were damaged but the losses were not of the magnitude described.

Additionally the Germans knew the attack was coming, had fortified the area extensively and counterattacked with several panzer divisions and lost up to 100 tanks themselves in the process; the attack effectively destroyed several panzer divisions ability to resist while the British divisions were able to continue the offensive several days later with Operation Spring before being redeployed across the front for Bluecoat.

If anything, Goodwood highlights that the comment of drawing the German tanks into a decisive battle and defeating them was very well much a possibility by the Allied forces. It was achieved at the Second Battle of El Alamein and it was achieved near Caen during Goodwood.

By Carl on Oct 26, 2009 at 9:11 am

Would logistic problems have defeated Monty’s big left hook?

If I may put in another word, the question of logistics is often raised. The Allies in autumn 1944 had great strength in manpower, armour and all equipment, but prior to opening up a large Channel port, it was impossible to bring all their strength to bear on the front line.

Eisenhower stated this problem meant Montgomery’s planned thrust could not have been maintained logistically. Carlo d’Este echoes that view. However, Monty’s plan, if implemented as he intended, would actually have solved the logistic problem more swiftly than any other approach.

First, you take all the armour and motorised units of four armies (Crerar, Dempsey, Simpson, Hodges) and make one mobile attacking force, under a single commander (Montgomery or Bradley). Secondly, you take the logistic resources (engineers, pioneers, transport, fuel, etc.) of five armies (the above four plus Patton) and use them to support the attack. You send this mighty force driving ahead on the left wing through Belgium and Holland, leaving non-motorised troops behind in static defence.

The attacking force is now more mobile than ever, because it is 100% motorised, and has more fuel than ever, because it has five armies’ worth of fuel in place of four. At the same time, the combined engineering and pioneer resources of five armies give it the ability to surmount rapidly any and all physical obstacles it may meet. It is also easier to resupply these forces, as they are all in one place, not dispersed on a wide front. In this way, the immediate logistic problems are solved.

The nub of the matter is this: the amount of fuel and resources initially available under Ike’s plan and Monty’s plan is the same. As events showed, that amount was sufficient to let five entire armies move forward steadily in line abreast along the whole front. If you extract the armour and mass it in one sector, and give it all the fuel and support, you can then drive that smaller but much more powerful force ahead a lot faster and a lot further.

What can the enemy now do against this fast-striding behemoth? Any German armoured force in or near its path faces a sharp dilemma: either fight where you stand (suicide) or withdraw to concentrate with other units (surrendering territory). The only logical course for the German armoured and mobile units is to withdraw, pull together whatever strength they have and postpone battle until it becomes unavoidable.

However, it is quite possible that Hitler, initially at least, would have issued non-withdrawal orders. In that case, each Panzer force would have been destroyed in turn as it came up against the Mighty Mobile. Either way, the Allied advance would rapidly clear the Low Countries of German armour. Now Antwerp and other ports could be opened up.

In this scenario, German occupying troops left stranded by the disappearance of their armour and supplies would no doubt resist for a time and would sabotage and destroy port facilities as much as they could (as happened in the actual event). However, the difference in this case is, first, the time they have available for sabotage is less, because the clearance of the region has been that much quicker, and secondly, the resources the Allies have for repairing facilities are that much greater (five armies’ engineers instead of one or two).

As a result, Antwerp and other ports would have been in operational use by the Allies a good deal earlier than actually happened, and the Allied thrust would have been reinforced all the more.

By Tom Black on Oct 28, 2009 at 5:21 am